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Abstract
Developers of fault-tolerant distributed systems need to guarantee that fault toler-
ance mechanisms they build are in themselves reliable. Otherwise, these mechanisms
might in the end negatively affect overall system dependability, thus defeating the
purpose of introducing fault tolerance into the system. To achieve the desired levels
of reliability, mechanisms for detecting and handling errors should be developed
rigorously or formally. We present an approach to modeling and verifying fault-
tolerant distributed systems that use exception handling as the main fault tolerance
mechanism. In the proposed approach, a formal model is employed to specify the
structure of a system in terms of cooperating participants that handle exceptions
in a coordinated manner, and coordinated atomic actions serve as representatives
of mechanisms for exception handling in concurrent systems. We validate the ap-
proach through two case studies: (i) a system responsible for managing a production
cell, and (ii) a medical control system. In both systems, the proposed approach has
helped us to uncover design faults in the form of implicit assumptions and omissions
in the original specifications.
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1 Introduction
Applications that could potentially endanger human lives or lead to great
financial losses are usually made fault-tolerant [1] so that they are capable
of providing their intended service, even if only partially, when errors occur.
Fault-tolerant systems include mechanisms for detecting errors in their states
and recovering from them. There are two main types of error recovery [1]:
backward and forward. The former is based on rolling a system back to its
previous correct state and generally uses either diversely implemented soft-
ware or simple retry; the latter involves transforming the system into any
correct state, is typically application-specific and relies on an exception han-
dling mechanism [2,3].
Usually, a significant part of the system code is devoted to error detection
and handling [2,4]. In 1989, Cristian [2] claimed that, for telephone switching
applications, this often amounted to more than two thirds of the overall system
code. A more recent study [4] of a set of open-source applications written
in Java discovered that between 1 and 5% of the program text consisted of
exception handlers (catch blocks) and clean-up actions (finally blocks). In
another study [5], focusing on five large-scale applications based on the Java
Enterprise Edition [6] platform, the ratio of the number of exception handlers
to that of operations in each application varied between 0,058 and 1,79. Finally,
some of us have conducted yet another study [7], involving four applications.
Two of themwere produced in industry and two in academia. In this case, the
ratio of the number of handlers to that of operations ranged from between
0,099 to 0,208.
In spite of the pervasiveness of error detection and handling code, it is usually
the least understood, tested or documented [2] in a system. This is mainly
due to the tendency among developers to focus on the normal activity of
applications and only deal with the code responsible for error detection and
handling at the implementation phase. What is more, there are other issues
that aggravate this situation in distributed systems, such as the high cost of
reaching an agreement, the lack of a global view on the system state, multiple
concurrent errors, difficulties in ensuring error isolation, etc. All of these factors
complicate the development of reliable systems in general and of mechanisms
that make them reliable in particular. The overall result is that the parts of
a system responsible for making it reliable are usually the source of design
faults [2,5,4].
For the desired levels of reliability to be achieved in a system, error detecting
and handling mechanisms should be systematically applied from the early
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phases of development [8]. Moreover, the construction of these fault tolerance
mechanisms should follow a rigorous or formal development methodology [9].
In this manner, these mechanisms are made more reliable and do not introduce
new faults into the system.
1.1 Problem
The concept of Coordinated Atomic (CA) Actions [10] was developed by
combining distributed transactions and atomic actions. The latter are used
to control cooperative concurrency and to implement exception handling [11],
whereas the former [12] are used to maintain the consistency of resources
shared by competing actions. CA actions function as exception-handling con-
texts for cooperative systems, and exceptions raised in an action are handled
cooperatively by all of its participants. If two or more exceptions are concur-
rently raised, an exception resolution mechanism [11] is employed to identify
an exception that represents all the exceptions raised concurrently (a resolved
exception) in order to handle it. Many case studies [13–16] have shown that
CA actions are a powerful and useful tool for structuring large distributed
fault-tolerant systems. In this paper, we view CA actions as representative of
mechanisms for exception handling in distributed systems.
In order for CA actions to be applicable in constructing complex real-world
systems with strict dependability requirements, software development based
on CA actions needs to be supported with rigorous models, techniques, and
tools. Several approaches have been proposed to formalize the CA action con-
cept aiming to either offer a more complete and rigorous description of the
concept [17] or to verify CA action-based designs [15]. However, there is an im-
portant aspect of CA actions that has not been properly addressed by existing
work, and that is coordinated exception handling. This is surprising, since ex-
ception handling complements other techniques in improving reliability, such
as atomic transactions, and promotes the implementation of specialized and
sophisticated error recovery measures. Moreover, in some distributed applica-
tions, a rollback is not possible or is prohibitively expensive. In this scenario,
exception handling may be the only sensible choice available.
Some authors [18] claim that mechanisms for involving multiple participants in
order to cooperatively handle exceptions are difficult for both implementation
and use. We believe, however, that programmers will make more mistakes in
an ad hoc implementation of cooperative exception handling than in applying
well-defined mechanisms provided by such general frameworks as CA actions.
There is thus a need for techniques and tools that would mitigate the inherent
complexity of exception handling in a concurrent setting and help developers
in specifying and designing systems that make use of this feature.
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In this paper, we examine the problem of specifying a CA action-based design
in a way that would allow automatic verification of whether it exhibits cer-
tain properties that are relevant to coordinated exception handling. Our aim
is to understand what would be required of modeling exception propagation
and handling in this design. Comprehension and documentation of exception
propagation in non-concurrent software systems is by itself a complex issue
and an active research area [19–24]. Concurrency is a serious complicating fac-
tor for exception propagation. In CA action-based design, a participant can
not only raise and handle exceptions, but also spawn new actions that are,
themselves, exception handling contexts involving multiple participants. What
further aggravates matters is that it is possible for two or more exceptions to
be concurrently raised inside an action. A model of actions and their partici-
pants must contemplate every possible combination of exceptions or, at least,
explicitly point out combinations that cannot happen in practice. Moreover, it
should make it possible to specify how participants react when faced with dif-
ferent sets of concurrently raised exceptions. Finally, since exception handling
is closely related to action structuring, it should also model the nesting and
composition [14] of CA actions and how these affect exception propagation
and handling.
1.2 Proposed Approach
In this paper, we present an approach to modeling CA action-based design
that makes it possible to automatically verify these models using a constraint
solver. The main component of the proposed approach is a formal model of CA
actions that specifies the structuring of a system in terms of actions, as well
as information relevant to exception flow amongst these actions. This model
can be directly specified using well-known specification languages, such as
Alloy [25] or B [26], and automatically verified using tool sets associated with
them. The proposed approach makes it possible to check whether a CA-action
based software system satisfies several key properties.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some background
on CA actions, the B method and notation, and the Alloy specification lan-
guage. Section 3 presents the proposed approach, including a description of
the generic CA action model and some of the properties that it helps to verify.
Section 4 formalizes the basic properties of the generic CA action model. We
then illustrate the feasibility and usefulness of the proposed approach in two
case studies. Section 6 reviews related work, and the last one sums up the
paper and outlines directions for future work.
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2 Background
In order to present our approach, we need to introduce several topics first.
We begin with CA actions, a scheme for building fault-tolerant concurrent
systems that employ exception handling. We then proceed to describe two
formal specification languages, Alloy [25] and B [26]. These languages are ex-
amples of formal notations that can be used in combination with the approach
proposed here in order to specify and verify some properties of fault-tolerant
distributed systems based on CA actions. Both are similar to Z [27], declara-
tive in nature, and supported by automated verification tools. It is important
to stress, however, that they were designed with very different goals in mind.
2.1 Coordinated Atomic Actions
CA actions are a unified scheme for coordinating complex concurrent activ-
ities and supporting error recovery among multiple interacting components.
It helps to decrease the overall system complexity and simplify development
by structuring the system in terms of nested recovery units. A CA action is
designed as a set of roles cooperating inside it and a set of resources accessed
by these roles. An action starts when its roles are taken by participants. A
participant abstracts away the underlying unit of concurrency, i.e., it can be
a process, a thread, an active object, or any similar mechanism. In the course
of the action, participants can access external resources. The latter must be
accessed according to the ACID (atomicity, consistency, isolation, durability)
properties and must provide means for these properties to be enforced. Action
participants either reach the end of the action and produce a normal outcome
or get involved in coordinated handling if one or more exceptions are raised
within the action. If handling is successful the action completes by producing
a normal outcome.
The CA action scheme enforces a clear difference between internal exceptions
(which are raised in the action and have handlers inside the action) and exter-
nal exceptions, which are signaled outside the action when the action cannot
deliver the expected results. The latter are used to report partial action out-
comes, abort effect, failure to achieve a consistent result by action participants,
etc. Internal exceptions are encapsulated in the action, whereas external ones
are visible in the action interface as they have to be dealt with by the contain-
ing action. When several exceptions are concurrently raised in a CA action,
an exception resolution mechanism is used to define a resolved exception that
represents all the exceptions that were raised. The resolved exception is then
handled cooperatively by all the action roles. Exception resolution uses a data
structure called the exception resolution graph, which maps sets of exceptions
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Fig. 1. A CA action example.
that can be concurrently raised to resolved exceptions. When an action can-
not handle a resolved exception, its roles attempts to perform backward error
recovery. If they succeed, the action is described as having aborted, because
the system is still left in a consistent state. If the roles are unable to per-
form backward error recovery, the action fails and no guarantees can be given
concerning the state of the system. In both cases, an exception is signaled to
the enclosing context in order to indicate that the action did not perform as
expected.
Figure 1 represents a simple system structured using CA actions. This diagram
shows how the units of computation in a system interact and what information
they exchange over a period of time. The top-level CA action A1 has three
roles performed by participants P1, P2, and P3. Participants P2 and P3 also
perform roles R4 and R5 respectively in the nested CA action A2. A nested
action defines the exception handling context within an enclosing action and
serves as a finer-grained damage confinement region. Role R5 of A2 spawns
composed CA action A3 at some point in time before the completion of A2.
R5 is interrupted from the moment A3 starts until it completes. Composed
actions are started by roles in order to perform specific tasks and their life-
cycles are bound to those of their spawning roles. The internal exceptions of
an action are represented by small squares (labeled E1, E2, E3, and E4 in the
figure). Each exception is placed near the role that it is raised by.
The fault tolerance approach to use in developing dependable systems largely
depends on the fault assumptions made and on the system characteristics and
requirements. In spite of all of its advantages, backward error recovery has a
limited applicability. Modern systems are increasingly relying on forward er-
ror recovery and appropriate exception handling techniques [2,28]. Examples
of such applications include complex systems involving human beings, COTS
components, external devices, several organizations, movement of goods, op-
erations on the environment, as well as real-time systems that do not have
time to go back. Service-oriented architectures also clearly fall into this cat-
egory [28]. The CA actions serve as a valuable conceptual tool in developing
these systems.
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2.2 The B Method
B is at the same time a formal development method and a modeling nota-
tion [26]. A formal B specification is a mathematical model of the required
behavior of a system or its part, represented by a collection of modules called
abstract machines. An abstract machine encapsulates a local state (local vari-
ables) and provides operations (events). The occurrence of events represents
the observable behaviour of the system. The event guard defines the condi-
tions under which the body can be executed. B statements used to describe
the body of events are a mixture of executable statements (e.g. assignments
or conditional statements) and abstract statements that use mathematical
operations over sets and functions. The following sections offer examples and
explanations of the B notation where appropriate.
The B Method supports top-down system development. In the development
process, an abstract specification is transformed into an implementation fol-
lowing a number of correctness-preserving steps called refinements. The B
method generates a number of correctness conditions, called proof obliga-
tions, for each refinement step. To guarantee that the refined system satisfies
(preserves) all the specified properties, these need to be proved true, thus
validating correctness. B models can also be subject to automated analysis
(model checking) through the use of the ProB constraint solver [29]. However,
since ProB uses undecidable logics, automated model verification must have
a bounded scope in order to guarantee that verification stops.
In this work, we have chosen to use B as a specification language in order
to realize the system model that we propose in Sections 3 and 4. This model
comprises three components: elements of CA action-based software systems,
relations and functions that connect and add information to these elements,
and predicates that define rules to which valid systems must adhere.
Some features of the B notation have prompted this choice. First, it sup-
ports the definition of both types of element in a system and their instances.
Moreover, both structural (actions, roles, participants) and data (exceptions)
elements can be modeled as typed entities. Second, it is expressive enough
to specify the formal model that we present in Section 4, including the more
convoluted predicates involving transitive closures and high-order relations.
Third, there is a large number of tools that support software development
based on B, both entirely automated and interactive. Fourth, it supports the
approach to structuring specifications that we employ. This is similar to soft-
ware development based on object-oriented frameworks: part of a system con-
sists of reusable code and design (in our case, reusable specification elements
and predicates), whereas the rest of it (specification) is application-specific.
The two parts are connected by the extension mechanisms provided by the
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underlying programming (specification) language.
2.3 Alloy Specification Language
Alloy [25] is a lightweight specification language for software design. It is
amenable to a fully automatic analysis using the Alloy Analyzer (AA) [30],
as well as providing a visualizer for making sense of solutions and counterex-
amples it finds. Alloy is based on first-order relational logic and, similarly to
other specification languages such as Z [27], supports complex data structures
and declarative models. Alloy aims to be a language for prototyping and ver-
ification, built with automated verification in mind from the start. In fact,
Alloy was devised as the simplest formal language that could still support the
creation of useful models. In this sense, it differs from Z, a more expressive
language, which is intended to support (interactive) theorem proving.
In Alloy, models are analyzed within a given scope, or size (the maximum
number of instances of a type). The analysis performed by the AA is sound,
since it never returns false positives. Yet similarly to B, verification of Alloy
models is incomplete because the AA checks are only conducted up to a certain
scope. It is, however, complete up to the selected scope, i.e., the AA never
misses a counterexample that is smaller than the specified scope. As pointed
out in the Alloy tutorial [31], small scope checks are still useful for identifying
errors. In the next sections, examples and explanations concerning the Alloy
notation are given where appropriate.
The use of Alloy for specifying and verifying software systems offers many
advantages: (i) it is a very simple language whose semantics is based on first-
order relational logic; (ii) developers used to object-oriented languages find its
syntax easy to learn; (iii) it has a very fast constraint solver; and (v) at least
for small systems, the graphical counterexamples produced by the AA are
easy to understand, especially when compared to execution traces. Its main
shortcoming is insufficient expressiveness. One consequence of its design goals
is that the language lacks several useful constructs for specifying systems,
such as the notion of function or high-order relations. We understand that
these constraints were intended to simplify automated verification, yet they
effectively limit the ability of developers to specify real systems. In Section 5.2,
we describe an example situation where this limited expressiveness makes it
difficult to apply the proposed approach.
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3 Proposed Approach
In order to construct robust fault-tolerant systems, it is imperative that de-
velopers start taking fault tolerance-related issues into account at the early
phases of development. Our ultimate goal is to devise a general approach to
rigorous development of dependable distributed systems that use both cooper-
ative and competitive concurrency. This work specifically addresses the issue
of verifying properties relevant to system structuring and coordinated excep-
tion handling in CA action-based design. The rest of this section overviews the
proposed approach and briefly describes some of the properties that it helps
to verify.
3.1 Overview
Figure 2 is a schematic representation of the proposed approach to verifying
CA action-based software systems. Developers start by performing the tradi-
tional activities of the software development process, namely, system analysis
and design. In doing that, they assume that the system is concurrent and co-
operative. At the same time, they define scenarios where the system may fail
(fault model), what exceptions correspond to each type of error, and where
and how the exceptions are handled (exceptional activity). The system fault
model and exceptional activity can be specified in the way prescribed by some
studies [8]. The result of these activities is a model of the CA action-based
system. This model identifies the exceptions that can be raised in each CA
action and how they are handled. It is written in a language for modeling
CA actions, for example, informal diagrams (as presented in Figure 1), the
Coala [17] formal language, or the FTT-UML [32] profile for the UML.
To verify a CA action-based design, it is necessary to translate it into a speci-
fication language with operational semantics that allows formal verification of
properties. Moreover, in accordance with the proposed approach, the language
should allow both data and structural elements to be defined as typed entities
that can be subtyped. In this paper we will refer to languages that meet these
criteria as specification languages. If the language for modeling CA actions
has a well-defined semantics like Coala, this translation can be completely
automated by a tool. The translation can also be automated for informal no-
tations, such as UML profiles, but only partially (syntactically). Usually some
manual intervention is required to resolve ambiguities. Those developers who
are more familiar with formal methods can write system descriptions directly
in the specification language, and we adopt this approach in the rest of this
paper. The choice of using one or two languages (one for modeling and one
for verification) is based solely on usability issues.
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Fig. 2. Overview of the proposed approach. White rectangles represent activities
and shaded ones stand for artifacts.
The formal specification that is produced by translating a CA action-based
design into the specification language must adhere to a generic CA action
meta-model, which defines the main concepts of CA actions and how they
relate (hereafter referred to as generic CA action model). In short, this model
describes an exception-handling mechanism based on CA actions, focusing
on how exceptions flow amongst system components. In the overview of the
generic CA action model offered in the next section, both the formal speci-
fication and the generic CA action model are described in the specification
language. Up to now, we have specified generic CA action models using B
and Alloy as specification languages [33]. Developers can use either of them
to formalize a CA action-based design (but not both simultaneously). The
purpose of having two different specification languages is to show that the
proposed approach is language-agnostic. A developer who intends to employ
our approach would therefore need to choose only one of them or define a
generic CA action model for yet another formal notation.
To verify a system, its formal specification, together with the properties to be
verified, is put into a constraint solver for the specification language. These
properties are predicates that must be true for the system to be deemed well-
defined or well-designed. In order to be applicable to any system description
adhering to it, they are specified in terms of the elements of the generic CA
action model. We have used the AA and ProB constraint solvers to verify for-
mal specifications in Alloy and B, respectively. If any of the relevant properties
does not hold, the constraint solver produces a counterexample. Besides gen-
erating a counterexample, each constraint solver includes a graphic visualizer
that also helps to identify the problem.
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In the rest of the paper, we focus on the three remaining activities in Figure 2,
namely, “Translate CA action-based design into specification language” (as-
suming that the system model is written directly in the specification language),
“Specify properties of interest” and “Verify that the formal specification sat-
isfies the properties”. It is these activities that are directly related to system
verification.
3.2 Generic CA Action Model
The generic CA action model formally defines an exception handling mecha-
nism for CA action-based systems. This model can be instantiated by systems
adhering to it so that certain properties related to the structure and flow of
exceptions in the system can be automatically verified. It is generic in the
sense that it does not depend on specific tools, formalisms or approaches to
verification. As mentioned in the previous section, up to now we have specified
generic CA action models using B and Alloy as specification languages. For
verification we employed the constraint solvers available for these languages.
An alternative to using the existing general-purpose constraint solvers would
be to build a specific verification tool based on the model. The trade-off in this
case is between performance (of verification) and flexibility (ability to specify
new properties that need to be verified).
In our view, the structure of a system is a hierarchy of actions that contain
nested actions and roles. Roles are performed by participants, units of com-
putation such as threads and processes; they can compose additional actions
that only make sense in the context of the spawning role. Hence, the main
elements of the generic CA action model are actions, roles, participants, and
exceptions. These elements are represented by objects of a certain type. The
proposed model employs a notion of type that is compatible with that used in
OO languages such as Java and C#. A type T is a set of instances, while its
subtypes T1, T2, ..., TN of T are disjoint subsets of T . Only single inheritance
is allowed.
Table 1 lists the elements of the proposed generic CA action model, i.e., the
main concepts used in the definition of CA actions. An exception is any in-
stance of type RootException, or some of its subtypes. The same applies to
actions, roles and participants, and types Action, Role and Participant, re-
spectively. We assume that instances of these types are uniquely identified by
their names. The sets in the table can also be seen as unary relations and are,
therefore, subject to operations that apply to relations, such as composition.
We use objects to represent exceptions rather than symbols or global variables
mainly because objects are more flexible and can encode arbitrary informa-
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Table 1
Basic elements of the proposed model
Element Description
Action Type that defines actions
Role Type that defines roles of actions
Participant Type that defines participants
RootException Type that defines exceptions
tion on the cause of an exception [34]. Also, there are many large and com-
plex software systems developed nowadays using object-oriented languages,
such as Java and C++, which present exceptions as objects. Additionally,
we avoided choosing a more usual name for the supertype of all exceptions,
such as Exception or Error, in order to afford developers the flexibility to
organize exceptions as required, e.g., by basing their organization on the
adopted programming language. For example, considering the exception han-
dling mechanism of Java, a developer should define at least four exception
types: (i) Throwable, a subtype of RootException; (ii) Exception, a subtype of
Throwable; (iii) Error, a subtype of Throwable; and (iv) RuntimeException,
a subtype of Exception. An application-specific exception type would then be
a subtype of one of these.
Additional information is associated with the elements of Table 1 through re-
lations (sometimes functions). For example, a set of action roles is defined by
the Roles ∈ Action×Role relation, which associates actions with their respec-
tive roles. The proposed model defines 16 different relations that specify three
different aspects of a CA action-based software system: (i) system structure;
(ii) exception flow; and (iii) exception resolution. The well-formedness of a
system adhering to the model is determined by a set of predicates, or basic
properties, defined in terms of these relations and the elements of the model.
Section 3.3 offers some examples of basic properties, while Section 4 presents
a formalization of the generic CA action model.
The relationship between the generic CA action model and a system descrip-
tion adhering to it is similar to that between an object-oriented framework and
a system that instantiates it. The model defines specific points where it can
be extended: extension points include types that correspond to the elements
of CA action-based systems (basic types). System descriptions instantiate the
model by using element types that extend (in the sense of object-oriented
inheritance) the basic types. Since the properties of interest are specified in
terms of the elements of the generic CA actions model, the aforementioned
relations and predicates also apply to system descriptions adhering to the
generic CA action model. This is similar to a method in an OO language that
has a parameter of a type T but also accepts parameters of a type T ′, subtype
of T . This approach separates the tasks of specifying a generic CA actions
model (performed only once for each specification language) from the task of
specifying a system and promotes reuse of properties of interest and system
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specifications. Nevertheless, a developer still needs to understand the generic
CA model in order to specify a system. Section 5 provides two examples of
instantiation of the generic CA action model.
3.3 Properties to be verified
Properties that a system must satisfy fall into three categories: basic, desired
and application-specific. Basic properties define the well-formedness rules of
the model, i.e., the characteristics of valid CA actions. They specify the coor-
dinated exception handling mechanism and how actions are organized. Below
are some examples of basic properties, stated informally.
BPA. If a participant performs a role in a nested action, it must also per-
form a role in the containing action. Participants are units of computation
(threads, processes) that perform roles in CA actions. In theory, any par-
ticipant can perform a role in a top-level CA action. However, for a nested
CA action, the definition of CA actions requires that only participants that
perform roles in the containing CA action do so in the nested one.
BPB. There are no cycles in action nesting. This property states that the
organization of actions in the system is hierarchical, and the graph formed
by their definitions (including those of nested and composed actions) has
no cycles.
BPC. The exception resolution mechanism of an action resolves all possible
combinations of concurrent internal exceptions, unless explicitly stated oth-
erwise. This property guarantees that every possible combination of concur-
rently raised exceptions is contemplated by the exception resolution graph
of each CA action. Some of these combinations must be resolvable by the
mechanism. The resolution graph must also explicitly account for those com-
binations of concurrently raised exceptions that can happen in theory, but
not in practice.
Desired properties are general properties that are usually considered benefi-
cial, although they are not part of the basic mechanism of CA actions. They
describe important requirements that most fault-tolerant software systems
should meet. In general, desired properties are based on the assumption that
the basic properties hold. Below are some examples:
DPA. Top-level CA actions have no external exceptions. This property states
that the system is, in fact, fault-tolerant. It specifies that all the exceptions
that reach top-level (non-nested, non-composed) CA actions are handled by
these actions, and the latter do not signal any exceptions. This guarantees
that the system never fails catastrophically due to unhandled exceptions.
The Ariane-5 control system [35] is a classic example of a system that failed
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predicate parts_ok() {
(all A:Action| (all NA:A.NestedActions|
all NAR:NA.Roles |
!(all P:Participant|!(NAR in P.RolesPlayed
&& some (P.RolesPlayed & A.Roles)))))
}
Fig. 3. Alloy specification of property BPA.
to meet this desirable property (it failed due to an uncaught exception),
resulting in a very expensive accident.
DPB. All internal exceptions of an action are handled within it, and therefore
no exceptions are propagated. This is a desirable property that is hard to
meet in practice. It states that the system adheres to the principle that an
error should be handled as close as possible to its detection site [1]. For CA
actions, it means that every action in the system is capable of handling all
the internal exceptions that can result from exception resolution within the
action, effectively masking their occurrence from the enclosing CA action.
Application-specific properties are rules about the flow of exceptions in a
specific CA action-based application. An example of an application-specific
property is given in Section 5.2. The generic CA action models we have spec-
ified so far include specifications of several basic and desired properties that
can be used “as-is”. Developers only specify additional desired properties and
application-specific properties, if any.
The rest of this section offers examples of properties of interest written in Alloy.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, in order to verify a CA action-based design,
it is necessary to specify relevant properties in the specification language.
While they do not inherently depend on any specific language, a specification
language is necessary to use generic constraint solvers, such as ProB and the
AA, for verification. Therefore, the examples we present in the rest of the
section could also have been written in B or, as we show in the next section, in
a language-agnostic manner, without significant difference. Figure 3 presents
a formal specification of property BPA in Alloy.
Figure 3 defines an Alloy predicate named parts ok. Alloy predicates are
logic sentences that must be checked by the AA. In the body of the predi-
cate, Roles, NestedActions and RolesPlayed are names of some relations
that associate information with the elements of the system. The “.” operator
represents relational composition (or join). More formally, given two relations
A ⊆ T1 × T2 × ...× Tn and B ⊆ Tn × Tn+1 × ...× Tn+m, A.B yields a relation
C ⊆ T1 × T2 × ... × Tn−1 × Tn+1 × ... × Tn+m. Relation C comprises all the
tuples formed by combining tuples from A and B whenever the last element of
a tuple from A is the same as the first of a tuple from B. For example, given
A = {(e1, e2), (e2, e3)} and B = {(e2, e4), (e2, e5), (e3, e6), (e7, e8)}, A.B yields
C = {(e1, e4), (e1, e5), (e2, e6)}. In the Alloy predicate presented in Figure 3,
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all A1:Action | ((all A2:Action |
!(A1 in A2.NestedActions)) && (all R:Role |
!(A1 in R.ComposedActions))) =>
(no A1.External)
Fig. 4. Alloy specification of property DPA.
A.NestedActions yields the set of actions nested within action A, assuming
that A ∈ Action, where Action is a type, and NestedActions is a relation
associating actions with their nested actions. Predicate parts ok states that
every role of every nested action is performed by a participant that also per-
forms a certain role in the enclosing action. The operators all, !, &&, and
& represent universal quantifier, logical negation, logical conjunction and set
intersection, respectively. The some keyword yields true if its argument is a
non-empty set.
The snippet in Figure 4 shows a formal specification in Alloy for property
DPA. It states that an action that is not nested within another action and not
composed by some role (i.e., top-level CA actions) has no external exceptions.
Operator => represents logical implication.
4 Formalization of the Generic CA Action Model
In this section, we formally specify the basic properties of the generic CA
action model, using a combination of the basic set theory and relational logic.
This formalization is compatible with both B and Alloy. In the latter case, due
to the inability of Alloy to specify high-order quantifications (Section 5.2), it
requires some minor adjustments. Our account covers three aspects of CA
action-based software systems: (i) system structure, (ii) exception flow and
(iii) exception resolution. These are explained in Sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3,
respectively.
4.1 System Structure
As mentioned in Section 3.2, we consider the structure of a system to be a
hierarchy of actions that contain nested actions and roles. System structure is
specified in terms of four relations:
• Roles ∈ Action ↔ Role
• NestedActions ∈ Action ↔ Action
• RolesP layed ∈ Participant ↔ Role
• ComposedActions ∈ Role ↔ Action
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Table 2
Properties that define valid structuring of a CA action-based system.
Property Constraint
BP1 ∀A ∈ Action • |{A}.Roles| > 0
BP2 ran(Roles) =ran(RolesP layed)
BP3 ∀A ∈ Action • ∀P ∈ Participant • |{P}.RolesP layed
⋂
{A}.Roles| ≤ 1
BP4 ∀R ∈ Role • |Roles.{R}| = 1
BP5 ∀A ∈ Action • ∀NA ∈ {A}.NestedActions • ∀NAR ∈ {NA}.Roles•
∃P ∈ Participant •NAR ∈ {P}.RolesP layed ∧
{P}.RolesP layed
⋂
{A}.Roles 6= {}
BP6 ∀CA ∈ (Action.Roles).ComposedActions • ∀P ∈ Participant•
{P}.RolesP layed
⋂
{CA}.Roles 6= {} ⇒ ¬(∃A ∈ Action •A 6= CA ∧
{A}.Roles
⋂
{P}.RolesP layed 6= {} ∧ A /∈ {CA}. ∗NestedActions)
BP7 ran(NestedActions)
⋂
ran(ComposedActions) = {}
BP8 ∀A ∈ Action •A /∈ {A}. ∗ (˜(Roles.ComposedActions
⋃
NestedActions))
Given an action A (an instance of type Action), expressions {A}.Roles and
{A}.NestedActions yield the set of roles of action A and the set of ac-
tions nested within A, respectively. Similarly, given participant P and role
R, {P}.RolesP layed and {R}.ComposedActions yield the set of roles that
P performs and the set of actions that R composes, if any, respectively. Ta-
ble 2 lists some constraints on relations Roles, NestedActions, RolesP layed
and ComposedActions. These constraints specify properties that need to be
exhibited by a system specification adhering to the generic CA action model.
Each one is identified by a name matching pattern BPX, where “BP” stands
for basic property and “X” is a positive integer. Properties BP1, BP2, BP3,
and BP4 specify the following fundamental constraints: (1) every action has
at least one role; (2) every role of every action is performed by some partic-
ipant; (3) a participant plays at most one role in any given action; (4) each
role is part of exactly one action. In the table, the “ran” operator yields the
range of a relation. Property BP5 specifies that all the roles in a nested ac-
tion are performed by participants who also play a role in the enclosing action.
It is a language-agnostic formalization of property BPA, specified both both
informally and formally (in Alloy) in Section 3.3. BP6 specifies a similar con-
straint that targets specifically composed actions. It states that participants
that perform roles in a composed action only perform roles in other actions if
the latter are nested within the composed one.
BP7 is a simple property specifying that nested actions cannot be composed
and vice versa. However, it does not preclude composed actions from having
nested actions. Conversely, it does not restrict the roles of nested actions from
spawning composed actions. Property BP8 specifies that a valid system has
no action nesting or composition cycle. It is a formal definition of property
BPB (Section 3.3). It considers a CA action-based design to be a graph where
actions are vertices and there is an edge between two arbitrary vertices A and
B if (i) B ∈ {A}.NestedActions or (ii) B ∈ ({A}.Roles).ComposedActions.
If there is a cycle in this graph, the system is considered invalid. In the table,
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the “*” and “˜” operators stand for transitive closure and the inverse relation,
respectively.
4.2 Exception Flow
Exception flow is specified in terms of twelve different relations. Six of them
indicate how exceptions flow amongst actions:
• Internal ∈ Action ↔ RootException
• External ∈ Action ↔ RootException
• AbortException ∈ Action → RootException
• FailException ∈ Action → RootException
• Resolution ∈ Action → (POW (RootException)→ RootException)
• Excluding ∈ Action ↔ POW (RootException)
The remaining six specify how exception flow works for roles of actions:
• Raises ∈ Role ↔ RootException
• Generates ∈ Role ↔ RootException
• Signals ∈ Role ↔ RootException
• Masks ∈ Role ↔ RootException
• Aborts ∈ Role ↔ RootException
• Propagates ∈ Role → (RootException → RootException)
Relations AbortException, FailException, Resolution, and Propagates are
in fact partial functions. In the rest of this subsection, each of these relations
is explained in more detail. We begin by describing the relations associated
with roles and then explain those that refer to actions.
Relations and properties connected with roles
We use two distinct relations to indicate the exceptions that each role is capa-
ble of handling. We are only interested in the effect the handler has on the flow
of exceptions, whether it stops exception propagation or not; modeling the be-
havior of the actual exception handlers is beyond the scope of this work. The
Masks relation specifies exceptions that are masked by a role. By “masked”
we mean that the component can take an action that stops the propagation of
the exception and makes it possible for the system to resume its normal activ-
ity. In the scope of cooperative concurrent systems based on CA actions, an
action A is capable of effectively masking an exception E if and only if, for ev-
ery one of its roles R ∈ {A}.Roles, E ∈ {R}.Masks. The Propagates relation
describes exception handlers that do not stop the propagation of exceptions.
These handlers end their execution by signaling the same exception or a new
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Table 3
Properties that describe a valid flow of exceptions amongst the elements of a system.
Property Constraint
BP9 Masks
⋂
Aborts = {}
BP10 Aborts
⋂
{R, E|R ∈dom(Propagates) ∧ E ∈dom(union({R}.P ropagates))} = {}
BP11 Masks
⋂
{R, E|R ∈dom(Propagates) ∧ E ∈dom(union({R}.P ropagates))} = {}
BP12 Raises = Generates
⋃
ComposedActions.External
BP13 ∀A ∈ Action • ∀R ∈ {A}.Roles • {R}.Signals = (ran(union({A}.Resolution)) \
{R}.Masks \ dom(union({R}.P ropagates)))
⋃
(ran(union({A}.Resolution))).(union({R}.P ropagates))
BP14 Internal = Roles.Raises
⋃
NestedActions.External
BP15 External = Roles.Signals
⋃
AbortException
⋃
FailException
BP16 ∀A ∈ Action • (∃E ∈ RootException • E ∈ran(union({A}.Resolution)) ∧
(∀R ∈ {A}.Roles • E ∈ {R}.Aborts)) ⇔ {A}.AbortException 6= {}
BP17 ∀A ∈ Action • (∃E ∈ran(union({A}.Resolution))•
¬(∃E′ ∈ RootException • {E}.union(({A}.Roles).P ropagates) = {E′}∧
((∀R ∈ {A}.Roles • E ∈dom(union({R}.P ropagates))) ∨E = E′)
) ∧ ¬(|({A}.Roles  {R}.Masks)  {E}|+ 2 ≤ |{A}.Roles|) ∧
E /∈ {A}.AbortException)⇒ |{A}.FailException| = 1
one. Propagates specifies a cause-consequence relationship between an excep-
tion that a role catches and one that it signals. Given a role R and exceptions
E and E ′, if {E}.union({R}.P ropagates) = E ′, we say that role R propagates
exception E ′ from exception E and handles E by propagating it. The “union()”
operator that appears above represents the generalized union over a set of sets.
We employ it to obtain a set of instances from a set of sets of instances of the
same type. For example, if Propagates = {R1 7→ {E1 7→ E2}, R2 7→ {E3 7→
E4}}, the expression {R1, R2}.P ropagates yields {{E1 7→ E2}, {E3 7→ E4}},
whereas union({R1, R2}.P ropagates) yields {E1 7→ E2, E3 7→ E4}.
When a role is not capable of appropriately handling an exception, it might
still be able to fail gracefully by returning to a state that is guaranteed to be
consistent, through using a backward error recovery mechanism. The Aborts
relation indicates whether a role can perform backward error recovery upon
receipt of an exception. If, for a role R and an exception E, R 7→ E ∈ Aborts,
we say that role R aborts on exception E. Properties BP9, BP10 and BP11
specify that the sets of exceptions that roles mask, propagate from and abort
on are disjunct. Properties BP10 and BP11 are more complex than BP9 be-
cause Propagates is a Role → (RootException → RootException) function,
whereas Masks and Aborts are Role ↔ RootException relations. The “dom”
operator yields the domain of a relation.
The generic CA action model uses three different relations to describe the
throwing of exceptions. The Raises relation lists the exceptions that each role
can raise within its parent action. The action treats these exceptions as internal
exceptions. Property BP12 defines this relation as the conjunction of the
exceptions generated by each role and the external exceptions of the actions
that it composes. The Generates relation specifies the exceptions generated by
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roles when erroneous conditions are detected. These conditions are dependent
on the semantics of the application and on the assumed fault model. For
reasoning about exception flow, it is the fact that the exception was raised
that is important rather than the error that caused an exception to be raised.
Finally, the Signals relation associates roles with the exceptions they throw
when unable to mask a resolved exception. The exceptions signaled by a role
are considered external exceptions of the parent action. Property BP13 of
Table 3 defines Signals in terms of three relations: Masks, Propagates and
Resolution. The latter is explained in the next subsection. Essentially, the set
of exceptions signaled by a role comprises (i) the resolved exceptions that it
does not handle (by either masking or propagating) and (ii) the exceptions it
propagates.
Relations and properties associated with actions
For actions, the most important relations relevant to exception flow are Internal
and External. The Internal relation specifies the exceptions that each action
raises internally. Conversely, External specifies what exceptions an action sig-
nals to enclosing actions or spawning roles (in the case of composed actions).
Properties BP14 and BP15 of Table 3 give definitions for the Internal and
External relations, respectively. The set of internal exceptions of an action
comprises the exceptions that its roles raise combined with the external ex-
ceptions of its nested actions. The set of external exceptions of an action is
composed by the exceptions that its roles signal combined with the exceptions
on which it fails or aborts. Relation AbortException specifies the exceptions
on which the actions in the system are capable of aborting. An action aborts
on an exception when it is unable to handle the exception, but every one of
its roles is capable of returning to a consistent state through backward error
recovery upon receipt of that exception. The FailException relation asso-
ciates actions with the exceptions that they signal when they fail. An action
fails when it is unable to signal an exception and does not implement a back-
ward error recovery mechanism. Property BP16 of Table 3 defines constraints
on the AbortException relation. It specifies that the roles of an action can
perform backward error recovery upon receipt of a certain resolved exception
if an only if the action is capable of aborting. The fact that an action A is
capable of aborting is represented by associating it with an exception in the
AbortException relation.
As pointed out in Section 2, a resolved exception is one that results from
exception resolution, the process that translates a set of concurrently raised
exceptions into a single exception representing multiple errors. The excep-
tion resolution graph of an action maps each set of exceptions that can be
concurrently raised within the action to an exception that the roles of the
corresponding action can attempt to handle. The Resolution relation speci-
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fies the exception resolution graph for each action in a system. It is possible
that not all the combinations of exceptions that can be raised by each role
can actually be raised concurrently. For example, even though roles R1 and
R2 raise exceptions E1 and E2, respectively, they never do so at the same
time. The Excluding relation explicitly states which potential combinations
of internal exceptions cannot be raised concurrently at runtime. This relation
is necessary because a valid action must work properly for any combination
of internal exceptions that can be concurrently raised, unless explicitly stated
otherwise. Exception resolution is discussed in more detail in the next section.
Property BP17 places constraints on the FailException relation. This prop-
erty specifies the sufficient conditions for the existence of an exception whose
purpose is to indicate the catastrophic failure of an arbitrary action A. More
specifically, it states that if the roles of A receive a resolved exception RE,
there is a certain exception E such that A 7→ E ∈ FailException if (i) action
A does not abort on RE; (ii) upon receipt of RE, two or more roles of A
signal (do not mask) exceptions, and these exceptions are distinct. The two
distinct exceptions may be signaled because (a) at least two different roles of
A, upon receipt of E, propagate distinct exceptions, or (b) at least one role
of A does not mask or propagate E, and at least one other role propagates
a different exception upon receipt of E. The “” operator in property BP17
stands for domain restriction. Given a set S and a relation R, S R is the set
of ordered pairs x 7→ y of R whose “x” element is also an element of S. For
example, given S = {a, b} and R = {a 7→ c, e 7→ b, b 7→ f, d 7→ g}, the domain
restriction S R is the set of pairs {a 7→ c, b 7→ f}. In the same vein, the “”
operator stands for range restriction.
4.3 Exception Resolution
As mentioned in the previous section, the Resolution relation is associated
with exception flow. However, an exception resolution graph is a complex
data structure whose well-formedness depends on conditions that are not di-
rectly related to exception flow. Therefore, we believe that it makes sense
to separately describe the predicates that specify valid exception resolution
graphs and their relationship with actions. We present these predicates in Ta-
ble 4. Property BP18 specifies that every action has an exception resolution
graph. Property BP19 imposes constraints on the domains of valid exception
resolution graphs. It states that exception resolution within an action must
involve only exceptions that can be actually raised by the roles of the ac-
tion, or external exceptions of its nested actions. The same applies to sets of
exceptions explicitly excluded from exception resolution, as specified by the
Excluding relation. Property BP20 states that a set of exceptions cannot at
the same time be resolved by the exception resolution graph of an action and
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Table 4
Properties specific to exception resolution graphs.
Property Constraint
BP18 Action =dom(Resolution)
BP19 ∀A ∈ Action•union(dom(union({A}.Resolution))
⋃
{A}.Excluding)
⊆ ({A}.Roles).Raises
⋃
({A}.NestedActions).External
BP20 ∀A ∈ Action•dom(union({A}.Resolution))
⋂
{A}.Excluding = {}
BP21 ∀A ∈ Action • ∀ES ∈dom(union({A}.Resolution))
⋃
{A}.Excluding•
let RE = {RR|RR ∈ POW (({A}.Roles  Raises)  ES)},
NE = {NN |NN ∈ POW (({A}.NestedActions  Exernal) ES)}•
∃ER ∈ RE, EN ∈ NE • |ER|+ |EN | = |ES| ∧ ran(ER)
⋃
ran(EN) = ES
(∀r ∈dom(ER) • |{r}.ER| = 1) ∧ (∀e ∈ran(ER) • |ER.{e}| = 1) ∧
(∀e ∈dom(EN) • |EN.{e}| = 1) ∧ (∀e ∈ran(EN) • |EN.{e}| = 1)
BP22 ∀A ∈ Action • ∀ES ∈ POW ({A}.Internal)•
ES ∈dom(union({A}.Resolution)) ∨ ES ∈ {A}.Excluding
be excluded from it.
Property BP21 of Table 4 is a formal specification of property BPC of Sec-
tion 3.3. It states that, for any set ES of concurrently raised exceptions in
the exception resolution graph of an action A, each exception in the set must
have been raised by a different role or nested action of A and none of them
may have contributed more than one element to ES. This property guaran-
tees that exception resolution graphs are consistent, i.e.,, they do not depict
impossible situations, such as a single role raising two or more exceptions at
the same time (though it might potentially raise many different exceptions).
Property PB21 uses a special keyword, “let”, to define a macro. This notation
means that, wherever the comma-separated identifiers immediately following
the “let” keyword appear in the rest of the predicate, they should be replaced
by the expressions following the “=” operator. For example, in property BP21,
the expression {RR|RR ∈ POW (({A}.RolesRaises)ES)} should be used
wherever the identifier RE appears.
Below is an example to illustrate property BP21. Given an action A1, roles
R1, R2, R3, and exceptions E1, E2, E3, E4, let us assume the following:
• {A1}.Roles = {R1, R2, R3},
• {A1}.NestedActions = {}
• Raises = {R1 7→ E1, R2 7→ E2, R2 7→ E3, R3 7→ E4}
• Excluding = {}
In this setting, if dom(union({A1}.Resolution)) = { {E1}, {E2}, {E3}, {E4},
{E1, E2}, {E1, E3}, {E1, E4}, {E2, E4}, {E3, E4}, {E1, E2, E4}, {E1, E3, E4} },
then A1 will be valid according to BP21, since (i) every possible combination
of concurrently raised exceptions is contemplated by the exception resolution
graph; and (ii) it does not include any combinations of exceptions that cannot
be concurrently raised. However, if the set {E1, E2, E3} was also an element of
dom(union({A1}.Resolution)), the resolution graph of A1 would not be valid
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because exceptions E2 and E3 cannot be raised concurrently: they can only
be raised by role R2, which can raise only one exception at a time.
5 Case Studies
In this section we present two case studies we have conducted in order to as-
sess the proposed approach. The first one consists in applying the proposed
approach to one of the CA actions of the well-known Fault-Tolerant Pro-
duction Cell system [36,37], which has been thoroughly studied in the CA
action literature [38,15,39,16]. The second case study examines the usefulness
of the proposed approach to formally modeling and verifying the informal CA
action-based design of an embedded control system for treating patients with
diabetes. The system, called the Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy, has
strict dependability requirements [40].
5.1 Fault-Tolerant Production Cell
The Fault-Tolerant Production Cell is a factory control system responsible for
production of forged metal plates. The production cell comprises six electro-
mechanical devices [37]: two conveyor belts (a feed belt and a deposit belt), an
elevating rotary table, two presses, and a rotary robot that has two orthogonal
extensible arms equipped with electromagnets. These devices are connected
to a set of sensors that provide useful information to a controller and a set of
actuators through which it can control the whole system. The task of the cell
is to get a metal blank from its “environment” via the feed belt, transform it
into a forged plate by using a press, and then return it to the environment via
the deposit belt.
As mentioned previously, various case studies presenting CA action-based
design of the Fault-Tolerant Production Cell have been published in recent
years [38,15,39,16]. Therefore, it is natural that we use part of it as a case
study to illustrate our own approach to developing CA action-based systems.
To keep the presentation brief, we focus on a single CA action, LoadPress1,
and the actions nested within it. This action was partially explained elsewhere
by Xu et al. [37]. We use their partial description of the system as the basis
for the application of our approach to LoadPress1.
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Fig. 5. Schematic view of the Fault-Tolerant Production Cell.
Fig. 6. Partial CA action-based design of the Fault-Tolerant Production Cell.
CA Action-Based Design
The LoadPress1 CA action controls the extensible arms of the robot in order
to get a blank from the rotary table and put it on press #1 (that will be called
Press1 here). Figure 6 presents a diagram of this CA action. For simplicity,
it does not show accesses to shared resources or interactions between partic-
ipants. The structure of the action indicates the workflow of its execution.
First, the robot rotates to a position where it can get a blank from the table,
uses the magnet of its first arm to get the blank, and rotates to a position
where it can reach Press1 (CA action RotateRobot). At the same time, Press1
moves to its middle position so that it can receive the blank (CA action Move-
Press1ToMiddle). The robot then extends its first arm and drops the blank on
Press1 (CA action ExtendArm1). After that, it retracts the arm and returns
to its original position (CA action RetractArm1).
Various types of exception can occur within LoadPress1. These exceptions are
related to either the robot or the press. As shown in Figure 5, the production
cell involves two presses. For simplicity, we consider that the second press is
redundant and only activated when the first one fails, in order to prevent an
interruption in the processing of metal blanks. In practice, however, one would
expect the two presses to work concurrently, so that a failure of one of the
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Table 5
Exceptions in the CA action-based design of the Fault-Tolerant Production Cell
Exc. Description
E1 Failure of the robot’s position or rotary sensors
E2 Retract or extend motor does not respond
E3 Arm 1 magnet fails
E4 Robot’s rotary motor fails
E5 The robot has a stuck or lost blank
Arm1Failure Generic exception type to denote a failure of
the first arm of the robot
E6 Failure of Press1’s blank or position sensors
E7 Press1’s motor fails
E8 Press1 has a stuck or lost blank
Press1Failure Generic exception type to denote a failure of Press1
presses would result in a degraded service mode.
In this case study, the system is able to successfully mask a failure of one
of the presses. An error in any other system component, however, means
that the production cell is unable to perform. Error handlers then attempt
to avoid catastrophic failure by leaving the cell in a safe state, e.g., robot
arms retracted, robot turned off, presses turned off, etc. Whenever an excep-
tion propagates to a top-level CA action, an alarm is activated to notify the
human operators of the error. Table 5 lists exceptions that can occur within
LoadPress1. Exception E2 was originally “retract motor fails”. However, since
the robot arms have motors for both retracting and extending, we have made
an addition to the original description. For brevity, in the model shown in
Figure 6 and in the rest of this section, we assume that only four amongst the
10 exceptions in Table 5 are internal to CA action LoadPress1: E1, E3, E6 and
E8. Also, we assume that at most two exceptions can be raised concurrently
within LoadPress1 and that no exceptions can be raised within the CA actions
nested within LoadPress1.
Applying the Proposed Approach
We modeled CA action LoadPress1 in B using the proposed approach. The
snippet in Figure 7 presents part of the resulting specification. This specifi-
cation is written in the Abstract Machine Notation [26], an ASCII notation
for B. The MACHINE clause specifies the name of the B machine, i.e., of the
(sub)system that this specification models. The SETS clause specifies the pos-
sible types of element in a model by means of B carrier sets. A carrier set in B
defines a set of data elements whose internal representation is not important.
In our approach, we employ carrier sets to define types of both structural ele-
ments (actions, roles, participants) and exceptions. A B carrier set is akin to
the given sets in Z [27]. The SETS clause in the specification of Figure 7 states
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MACHINE FTProdCell
/* System descriptions should modify the elements of
the sets ACTION, PARTICIPANT, ROLE, and
ROOT_EXCEPTION and the initialization. */
SETS
ACTION = {LoadPress1,...};
ROLE = {RobotSensor, RobotArm, ...};
ROOT_EXCEPTION={E1, E3, Arm1Failure, GeneralFailure,...};
PARTICIPANT = {P1, P2, ...}; ...
VARIABLES
Internal, External, Roles, NestedActions,
Signals, Raises,...
INVARIANT
Roles:ACTION <-> ROLE & External:ACTION <-> ROOT_EXCEPTION
& Resolution:ACTION +-> (POW(ROOT_EXCEPTION)
+-> ROOT_EXCEPTION) & ...
INITIALISATION
Roles := {LoadPress1|->RobotSensor,
LoadPress1|->RobotArm,...} ||
External := {LoadPress1|->Arm1Failure,
LoadPress1|->GeneralFailure,...} ||
Internal := {LoadPress1|->E1, LoadPress1|->E3,...} ||
NestedActions := {LoadPress1|->RotateRobot,...} ||
Resolution := {LoadPress1|->{{E3, E6}|->GeneralFailure,
{E1, E3}|->Arm1Failure,...}} ||
Signals := {RobotArm|->GeneralFailure,
RobotArm|->Arm1Failure,...} ||
Raises := {RobotArm|->E3,...} ||
Generates := {RobotArm|-> E3,...} ||
Excluding := {LoadPress1|->{E1, E6, E8},...} || ...
OPERATIONS
...
END
Fig. 7. B specification of the Fault-Tolerant Production Cell.
that there is one action in the system called LoadPress1, two roles named
RobotSensor and RobotArm, and so on.
The VARIABLES clause, which in B is employed to specify variables of a model,
specifies the relations defining the proposed exception flow model. Type con-
straints for these variables are specified by the INVARIANT clause. For example,
it states that Roles is an Action ↔ Role relation. Both clauses are part of
the generic CA action model. imported by different system descriptions. This
subject is further discussed in the next section. The INITIALISATION clause
assigns values to the variables defined under VARIABLES. In the example of
Figure 7, it states that action LoadPress1 has roles named RobotSensor and
RobotArm. It also states that LoadPress1 has at least two external excep-
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tions: GeneralFailure and Arm1Failure. We briefly explain our use of the
OPERATIONS clause later in this section.
Since we have applied the proposed approach to a partial (purposefully in-
complete) specification [37], some of the problems we encountered may have
been addressed in subsequent work on the Fault Tolerant Production Cell.
Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that the application of the proposed ap-
proach did identify several important issues that should have been included
in the system specification. For example, the original specification does not
clarify what should be done when two or more devices fail concurrently (e.g.,
Press1 fails and the robot fails as well). However, as can be seen from the
structure of the system, this is a real possibility (e.g., E1 and E8 from Fig-
ure 6 could be raised concurrently within LoadPress1) and our generic CA
action model requires that this is addressed. Therefore, we introduced an ad-
ditional exception, naming it GeneralFailure, that is signaled by LoadPress1 to
its enclosing context. As its name indicates, it signals a generalized failure in
the production cell (e.g., because both the press and the robot failed).
Additionally, the application of the proposed approach highlighted the need
to understand how the internal and external exceptions of LoadPress1 relate.
For example, the action has an external exception Press1Failure and an inter-
nal one press1 failure. It is not, however, clear from the system specification
what each one means and, most importantly, what (if any) is the causality
relation between them. We claim that the proposed approach highlights this
issue because it requires us to explicitly indicate the internal exceptions that,
when raised, might result in the signaling of a given external exception. If
this information is not given in a B specification adhering to the proposed
approach, ProB will complain during verification.
We specify the basic properties of the generic CA action model in B under the
OPERATIONS clause of the B machine. Each operation evaluates a guarded con-
dition (corresponding to the conjunction of some of the basic properties) and
assigns the value “yes” to an auxiliary variable if it is true, and “no” other-
wise. Under the INVARIANTS clause, we specify an invariant that says that each
such auxiliary variable must always have the “yes” value. Therefore, if a basic
property is violated, the value “no” will be assigned to one of the auxiliary
variables, and ProB will point out an invariant violation. For example, if we
modify the specification presented of Figure 7 so that the role RobotArm raises
exception E3 but does not generate it, ProB detects an invariant violation due
to the rolesConsistent operation (Figure 8).
The B snippet in Figure 8 defines an operation named rolesConsistent that
does not take any input parameters. The body of the operation consists of
a guarded command. The guard specifies that, for every action Act and ev-
ery role R of Act (operator “!” indicates universal quantification), the set of
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rolesConsistent =
IF !Act.((Act:ACTION) =>
!R.((R:ROLE & R:Roles[{Act}]) => ...
& (Raises[{R}] = External[ComposedActions[{R}]] \/
Generates[{R}])
) )
THEN RolesConsistent := yes
ELSE RolesConsistent := no
END;
Fig. 8. A B operation specifying a property of interest.
IF !Act.( (Act : ACTION) => ...
& (#E.(E:ROOT_EXCEPTION & E:ran(union(Resolution[{Act}])) &
(!R.((R:ROLE & R:Roles[{Act}])=> E:Aborts[{R}]))
) => (#AE.(AE:ROOT_EXCEPTION &
AE = AbortException(Act)))
)
)
THEN ActionsConsistent := yes
ELSE ActionsConsistent := no
END;
Fig. 9. B specification of property BP16.
exceptions that R raises comprises the exceptions that it generates combined
(\/ is the set union operator) with the set of exceptions signaled by actions
that it composes. If the guard evaluates to true, the “yes” value is assigned
to the RolesConsistent auxiliary variable, indicating that no invariant vi-
olations occurred. Otherwise, the variable receives the “no” value, signaling
a violation. In the example of Figure 8, the notation A[{B}], where B is a
single element and A is a relation, is equivalent to {B}.A, where “.” represents
a relational join.
The B snippet in Figure 9 presents the specification of basic property BP16
(Section 4.2). This predicate specifies that, if all the roles in an action Act can
perform backward error recovery upon receipt of a certain resolved exception,
then the action is capable of aborting. In our generic CA action model, this is
represented by the existence of a pair { Act 7→ E } ∈AbortException, where
E is an exception.
The predicate in Figure 9 states that, for each action Act in a system, if
there is an exception in the exception resolution graph of Act to which a
set of concurrently raised exceptions is mapped, and this exception is in the
Aborts set of every role of Act, then there is an exception mapped to Act
in AbortException. This mapped exception is signaled by Act to indicate to
an enclosing action that it has failed but was able to perform backward error
recovery. Operator “#” represents existential quantification in B.
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In conducting this case study, we have analyzed a number of papers, technical
reports and specific scenarios. Nevertheless, we have not found any suggestion
as to what the system should do when three or more exceptions are raised
concurrently within an action. At first, we assumed that this was simply due
to space constraints. A more in-depth study, however, has shown a funda-
mental limitation in the use of CA actions. In accordance with the existing
definitions of CA actions [17,10], our model requires that developers either
describe an exception resolution graph comprising every combination of ex-
ceptions that can be concurrently raised within each action in a system or
explicitly specify cases that cannot happen in practice. This requirement of
CA actions is intended to improve fault tolerance, as it produces concurrent
systems that are capable of gracefully handling any possible combination of
system errors. At the same time, however, it reduces the scalability of CA
actions in general and exception resolution graphs in particular. The size of
the resolution graph grows exponentially with the number of exceptions that
can be raised concurrently within a given context. For example, if we included
all the 8 internal exceptions of Table 5 (E1-8) in our model, we would end
up with more than 250 different combinations. Although there are cases that
cannot happen in practice (e.g., when the same role raises two different ex-
ceptions at different moments), they still have to be addressed, one by one, by
the Excluding relation. It should be stressed that this problem is not specific
to the proposed approach, but is typical of the use of exception resolution
graphs in general. Our approach simply highlights this limitation because it
adheres to the definition of CA actions and requires CA action-based design
to contemplate every possible combination of concurrently raised exceptions.
5.2 Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy
The Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy [40] (FTIPT) is a control system
for treating patients with diabetes with strict reliability requirements. The sys-
tem is based on the Continuous Subcutaneous Insulin Injection technique [40]
and involves several sensors and actuators that must function concurrently
and continuously. These sensors and actuators are wearable devices worn by
patients undergoing treatment. The dose of medicine administered by the sys-
tem includes two types of insulin: rapid action insulin (RAI) and long action
insulin (LAI). Sensors and actuators exchange information through wireless
communication channels. Sensors send information about the vital signs of a
patient to a server located in a hospital. The latter forwards this information
to a doctor who defines the amount of insulin to inject. The server then com-
municates with the actuators that use pumps to administer the established
dose of insulin.
Both sensors and actuators may fail. Sensors can fail by stopping to send
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Fig. 10. CA action-based design of the Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy
information about a patient’s vital signs. However, when they do send infor-
mation, the latter is assumed to be correct. Actuators can also fail - among
other things, because there is not enough insulin to apply the required dose.
Whenever an error is detected, treatment is interrupted and an alarm located
in a remote emergency room is activated. We assume that the wireless channels
do not fail.
CA Action-Based Design
Capozucca et al [40] use CA actions to design and implement the FTIPT.
The system is organized as a set of actions that structure the execution of
sensors and actuators. Coordinated exception handling is used as the main
fault tolerance mechanism, since it is not possible to roll back when insulin
has been administered to a patient. The CA action-based design devised by
the authors is informal and specified using diagrams and textual descriptions.
Figure 10 presents a diagram of the system. For simplicity, it does not show
accesses to shared resources or interactions between participants. CA action
CAA Cycle controls the overall execution of the system and determines the
amount of insulin that must be injected for each pump on the basis of the
patient’s vital signs. Actions CAA Sensors and CAA Actuators are spawned by
roles ControllerChecking and ControllerExecuting of actions CAA Checking and
CAA Executing, and are responsible for collecting the patient’s vital signs and
administering the insulin, respectively. Each of these composed CA actions
has three roles. Roles A RAIP and A LAIP of CAA Actuators spawn composed
CA actions CAA RAIP and CAA LAIP, respectively. The latter two control the
two pumps that will administer the two types of insulin.
Seven different types of exceptions can be raised in the system (Table 6). For
most of these errors, exception handling consists in stopping the treatment
and activating the alarm in the emergency room. In some cases, such as when
the value of a sensor cannot be obtained, the handler will try again once before
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Table 6
Exceptions in the CA action-based design of the FTIPT
Exc. Description
E1 Heart Rate (HR) sensor does not respond
E2 Blood Glucose (BGC) sensor does not respond
E3 Delivery limit reached
E4 Rapid action insulin pump (RAIP) does not respond
E5 Rapid action insulin pump (RAIP) stops during delivery
E6 Long action insulin pump (LAIP) does not respond
E7 Long action insulin pump (LAIP) stops during delivery
giving up.
Applying the Proposed Approach
We have modeled the CA action-based design described in the previous section
in Alloy. The specification snippet in Figure 11 shows part of the Alloy spec-
ification of the system. Its complete specification is available elsewhere [33].
In Alloy, a signature (sig keyword) specifies a type. Keyword one indicates
that a signature has exactly one instance 1 . We use signatures for modeling
actions, roles, participants and exceptions (signature Key will be explained be-
low). Additional information is associated with these elements using relations
(Section 3.2). These relations are explicitly instantiated by facts, i.e., predi-
cates that the AA must assume to be true when evaluating constraints. For in-
stance, fact SystemStructure in the snippet in Figure 11 states, among other
things, that CA action CAAChecking has two roles, ControllerChecking
and ParamsChecking, and no nested actions. Moreover, it states that par-
ticipant P1 performs roles ControllerChecking and ControllerCycle of ac-
tions CAAChecking and CAACycle, respectively. Moreover, fact ExceptionFlow
states, among other things, that roles BGC and HR raise exceptions E1 and E2,
and that these are internal exceptions of CA action CAASensors. The open
clause in the beginning of the specification imports the definitions of the basic
types of the proposed model: Action, Role, Participant and RootException.
Moreover, it imports the predicates that specify the basic properties of CA
actions and certain predefined desired properties.
Fact ExceptionResolution in the specification in Figure 11 describes the ex-
ception resolution graph of the FTIPT. It uses subtypes K1 and K2 of signature
Key to associate internal and external exceptions of action CAASensors. Key
1 In Alloy, a type is simply a set of instances. Moreover, for the sake of uniformity
and ease of use, Alloy treats instances (single elements) as unitary sets. Therefore, a
singleton type can be treated as an instance of itself in a specification. For example,
signature CAACycle defines both the homonym type and its sole instance.
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//Imports generic CA action model
open CoordinatedExceptionHandling
//CA actions extend ‘‘Action’’, roles extend ‘‘Role’’,
//exceptions extend ‘‘RootException’’, etc.
one sig CAACycle, CAAChecking, CAASensors,
CAAExecuting extends Action{}
one sig ControllerChecking, ParamsChecking, S_CT, BGC,
HR extends Role {}
one sig E1, E2, E3 extends RootException {}
one sig P1, P2, P3, P4, P5 extends Participant {}
one sig K1, K2, K3 extends Key {}
... //Other declarations.
fact SystemStructure {
CAACycle.NestedActions = CAAChecking + CAAExecuting
CAACycle.Roles = ControllerCycle + ParamsCycle
+ Calculus
CAAChecking.Roles = ControllerChecking + ParamsChecking
no CAAChecking.NestedActions
ControllerChecking.ComposedActions = CAASensors
CAASensors.Roles = S_CT + BGC + HR
P1.RolesPlayed = ControllerCycle + ControllerChecking
...// Other definitions. }
fact ExceptionFlow {
CAASensors.Internal = E1 + E2
CAASensors.External = AlarmEXC
BGC.Generates = E1 && BGC.Raises = E1
HR.Raises = E2 && HR.Generates = E2
...// Other definitions. }
fact ExceptionResolution {
CAASensors.ToResolve = E1->K1 + E2->K2
CAASensors.Resolved = K1->AlarmEXC + K2->AlarmEXC
...// Other definitions.}
Fig. 11. Alloy specification of the Fault-Tolerant Insulin Pump Therapy
is an auxiliary signature defined in the Alloy version of the generic CA action
model. It is necessary because the exception resolution graph of an action is a
function from sets of exceptions to exceptions. Since it is not possible to define
high order relations in Alloy, we used a pair of relations, with one associat-
ing internal exceptions to keys (ToResolve), one key for each mapping, and
the other associating each key to an external exception (ResolvedTo). Fact
ExceptionResolution states that exceptions E1 and E2 are both resolved to
exception AlarmEXC. We would like to emphasize that this workaround used
for specifying the exception resolution graph of an action is not necessary in
the B version of the generic CA action model.
The positive outcome of our work on developing the formal specification of the
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(AlarmEXC in CAACycle.Masks)
&& (all A:(Action - CAACycle)
| AlarmEXC in A.Internal => AlarmEXC in A.External)
Fig. 12. An application-specific property of the FTIPT system.
FTIPT case study is that it has helped us to identify a number of shortcomings
in the original informal description of the system. These were discovered in
the process of formalizing and verifying the system.
According to the original system description, the handlers for exceptions E4
and E6 “must stop the delivery of insulin and ring the danger alarm”. This
statement does not identify, however, which CA action will be responsible for
ringing the alarm when one of these exceptions is raised. Even though we
are not explicitly modeling the actual alarm, this information is still relevant.
If the alarm is to be activated by a CA action other than that where the
exception was raised, an exception should be propagated from the CA action
where the error was detected to the one that will ring the alarm. However, no
such exception exists in the original design of the system.
For simplicity, we could assume that a certain role in the CA action where
an exception is raised is responsible for ringing the alarm. However, this is
not the best option since it disperses the responsibility of activating the alarm
through the entire application, partially defeating the purpose of decompos-
ing the system into actions. In the end, we decided to add a new exception
named AlarmEXC to the system specification. This exception is signaled by
actions CAASensors, CAARAIP and CAALAIP, and propagated all the way up to
CAACycle, where it is handled. In our later discussion of the matter with the
authors of the original case study, it transpired they had intended to make
it possible to signal failures to the most external CA actions; however, the
paper does not propose any means for achieving this. In order to explicitly
establish that AlarmEXC can only be handled by CAACycle, we have specified
this constraint as an application-specific property (Figure 12). Assuming the
basic properties hold, it states that, for any action other than CAACycle, if
AlarmEXC is an internal exception, it is also external. Moreover, it states that
CAACycle handles AlarmEXC.
After finishing the specification of the system in Alloy, we tried to verify the
basic CA action properties using the AA. In a few seconds, the latter presented
a counterexample indicating that the specification failed to satisfy a relevant
property. A careful analysis of the counterexample revealed that property
BP21 of the previous section was being violated. This happened because the
case where exceptions E1 and E2 are raised concurrently in action CAASensors
was not covered by the exception resolution mechanism of the action. This is a
direct violation of basic property BP22 (Section 4.3). To fix the specification,
we extended the resolution mechanism of the action so that, when these two
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exceptions are raised concurrently, they are resolved to AlarmEXC. However, a
discussion of this problem with the authors of the original case study revealed
that these two exceptions are actually never raised concurrently in practice.
Hence, we modified the Alloy specification accordingly. The generic CA ac-
tion model defines a relation, Excluding, intended to exclude combinations
of internal exceptions that are never raised concurrently from the exception
resolution graph of an action. This relation is already taken into account by
the basic CA properties defined by the generic CA action model. By default,
no combinations are excluded. The following line was introduced in the spec-
ification of the system:
CAASensors.Excluding = (E1 + E2) -> K3
6 Related Work
Several models have been proposed for formalizing the CA action concept with
the intention either to give a more complete and rigorous description of the
concept or to verify systems designed using CA actions. In this section we
briefly describe the most significant amongst these formalizations, comparing
them to our own work. The COALA framework [17] was proposed to allow
system developers to model complex distributed/concurrent systems. Within
this framework a formalization of the CA action concept is developed using
CO-OPN/2 [41], an object-oriented language based on Petri nets and partial
order-sorted algebraic specifications. Although CO-OPN/2 specifications are
amenable to mechanical verification (through translation to “regular” Petri
nets), no attempt is made to specify systems properties or verify systems de-
scribed in COALA. The authors’ main goal is to devise a semantically precise
specification language for CA actions.
Another model used for formalizing the CA action concept is the ERT (ERT
stands for extraction, refusals and traces) [42]. Refusals and traces are notions
that come from semantic models of CSP; the term extraction refers to a specific
technique used to relate systems specified at different levels of abstraction.
This model does not have as strong a focus on exception flow as ours. Hence,
there are many properties that we can verify, especially those relevant to
exception resolution, that cannot be directly specified using the ERT-based
model.
A mathematical framework, based on Timed CSP, for representing the use of
CA actions in real-time safety-critical systems is proposed in [43]. It allows
the interactions between concurrently functioning pieces of equipment to be
modeled - and their behavior to be reasoned about - in an abstract way. The
framework models dynamic system structuring using CA actions and explicitly
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uses events representing synchronization between items and the control system
to allow the action context to be changed dynamically. Unlike our approach,
the framework was not developed for dealing with erroneously behaving action
participants. However, it helps to achieve a better understanding of the CA
action concept and can be used in developing general models incorporating
mechanisms that support system safety.
Tartanoglu et al. [44] have devised a formalization for CA actions using the
B method. More specifically, they have formalized part of the CA action mid-
dleware infrastructure. This work is complementary to ours in that it focuses
on an issue that we do not tackle: the dynamic structure of CA actions, e.g.,
joining participants, the start and end of nested CA actions, etc. The au-
thors’ account of how they address issues such as exception flow and resolu-
tion is, however, very sketchy. Moreover, they do not discuss how to model CA
action-based applications using their approach, or how to conduct automated
verification.
The concept of Dependable Multiparty Interactions (DMIs) [16] has many
similarities with that of CA actions, and is formally specified using Temporal
Logic of Actions [45] (TLA). There were several earlier attempts to specify
the CA action semantics using TLA (for example, the one reported in [46]).
However, none of them has been used to mechanically verify whether a sys-
tem model satisfies certain properties. In another work [47], Bertolini et al.
modeled DMIs using Stochastic Automata Networks, a formalism based on
Markov chains. This formalization is complementary to ours, as it focuses
on the throughput of a DMI-based system, particularly when failures occur
periodically.
Xu et al. [48] use a formal approach to model and verify a safety-critical
system designed using CA actions. To model-check the system controlling a
fault-tolerant Production Cell, the state transition system corresponding to a
CA action-based design is expressed in SMV (Symbolic Model Verifier) [49],
and the properties of the system to be analyzed are expressed in CTL. This
work strongly emphasizes the execution order of CA actions in a system.
The authors also model the exception resolution graph for the CA actions
they design, but the approach they propose does not include any means for
verifying, for example, whether a resolution graph is valid. Nevertheless, this
work is also complementary to ours, as it models aspects of CA action-based
systems that ours does not.
Capozucca et al. [50] describe a framework for implementing systems based on
CA actions. Their framework, CAA-DRIP, is an evolution of the DRIP frame-
work proposed by Zorzo and Stroud [39]. Complementing the description in
CAA-DRIP, the authors also present a partial formalization of CA actions
based on statecharts [51]. This formalization focuses only on the overall states
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in which a CA action can be, without going into the more convoluted mech-
anisms of CA actions, such as the structuring of the actions that compose a
system or exception resolution.
In a previous work [52], some of us have described an approach to designing
and verifying an architectural view [53] that centers on how exceptions flow
amongst architectural components. This work places more emphasis on the
effect that different architectural styles [54] have on exception propagation
than on the verification of properties associated with exception flow. Moreover,
it does not deal with software systems where multiple exceptions might be
raised concurrently within the same exception-handling context.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared elsewhere [55]. It does not explain
the generic CA actions model (either formally or informally), presents only one
case study, does not show how the proposed approach can be instantiated to
the B notation, or discuss related work. In another earlier study [21] some of
us defined a formal exception flow model for non-distributed software archi-
tectures. Although we use a similar approach in order to define this previous
model (a generic model, applications adhering to the model and mature verifi-
cation tools), the generic model itself differs greatly from the one we present in
this paper. The most important difference is that for cooperative concurrent
systems exception-handling contexts are much more complex. In such systems,
a context must involve all the processing units that cooperate, and exception
handling should also be performed cooperatively. For non-cooperative systems,
contexts are localized processing units (i.e., exception handling concerns only
a single component), and exceptions are either handled within them or propa-
gated to an outer context that is also localized. Another significant difference
is that exception propagation is much more complex in an exception-handling
mechanism that involves cooperative handling. This shows in many parts of
the formal model and, particularly, in Section 4.3, where we describe how
exception resolution works. This issue does not arise for systems where only
one exception at a time can be raised within an exception-handling context.
Finally, it is important to stress that this previous work does not include any
case studies, whereas in this paper we present two extensive case studies.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have presented an approach to specifying and verifying cooperative con-
current systems that use exception handling to achieve fault tolerance. The
purpose of this approach is to guarantee that the fault tolerance mechanisms
used to build a reliable system are also reliable. The main contribution of
this paper is to offer a formalization of CA actions that makes it possible to
automatically check whether a CA action-based design satisfies certain prop-
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erties related to exception handling. The usefulness of the proposed approach
has been demonstrated by two case studies. Even for simple applications, the
proposed approach has helped us to uncover some implicit assumptions in the
original designs of the systems. The problems we have identified are directly
related to the use of exception handling. It would be harder to expose issues
like that using other formal models to specify CA actions because they focus
on different aspects of CA action-based systems, such as temporal ordering of
events [15] or dynamic CA action structuring [44].
This work does not address all of the important aspects of systems structured
as CA actions. For example, our approach does not model consistent access to
external resources or the dynamic structure of nested actions. Furthermore,
this work does not cover issues related to synchronization amongst action par-
ticipants. In the future, we intend to expand the system model used in our
approach to address these issues and provide a more comprehensive frame-
work for verifying CA action-based systems. More specifically, we intend to
devise a way to separate the specifications of the CA actions middleware from
CA action-based applications. Moreover, we are currently working on a rig-
orous software development methodology whose emphasis is on modeling the
error-handling behavior of software systems. This methodology employs the
proposed approach to verification.
The Fault-Tolerant Production Cell case study has shown that the exception
resolution graph approach [11] to dealing with concurrently raised exceptions is
not scalable. This suggests that future research on exception handling for con-
current systems should pursue more scalable solutions to dealing with multiple
exceptions being raised at the same time. An alternative would be to guarantee
that certain parts of an asynchronous system are executed synchronously.
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